The 3D era is often told as a GPU story. But the true leverage point was media:
- CDs were cheap to manufacture.
- CDs held orders of magnitude more data than cartridges.
- CDs lowered the financial risk for publishers — and enabled bigger, more cinematic games.
Once that equation landed, it didn’t just change graphics. It rearranged the entire industry’s alliances.
The Broken Deal: Nintendo, Sony, Philips
The Broken SNES CD-ROM Partnership
Late in the SNES era, Nintendo and Sony worked together on a SNES CD-ROM add-on, code-named “Play Station”.
- The contract reportedly gave Sony unusually strong control over the CD format and its licensing.
- Nintendo feared losing control of its software revenue.
In a now-famous move, Nintendo publicly announced at a trade show that it would instead partner with Philips on CD technology — right after Sony had presented the joint project.
Consequence:
- Sony continued development internally, turning the project into a standalone console: PlayStation.
- Philips received limited rights to use Nintendo characters, which eventually birthed the infamous low-budget Zelda and Mario games on CD-i.
- Nintendo cancelled the SNES CD path altogether.
Nintendo’s attempt to protect its licensing power accidentally created its next major competitor.
CD Economics + 3D Momentum: PlayStation
Sony PlayStation — Cheap CD Hardware, Friendly to Third Parties
The PlayStation launched in 1994 (Japan) and 1995 (US/EU).
- Hardware:
- 32-bit R3000 class CPU built for 3D math.
- Affine-textured polygons with no hardware perspective correction — visually wobbly but very fast for the era.
- Simple, effective audio for streamed CD music and sound effects.
- Media:
- CD-ROM with ~650–700 MB capacity per disc, dirt-cheap to manufacture compared to cartridges.
- Business:
- Licensing terms and dev tools were much friendlier than Nintendo’s.
- Sony’s experience in music and movies gave it a distribution edge.
Third-party publishers flocked to PlayStation, especially those who wanted cinematic production values: pre-rendered backgrounds, FMV cutscenes, full voice tracks.
Cartridges Hold On — And Pay the Price
Nintendo 64 — Fast Cartridges, Slow Ecosystem
The Nintendo 64 answered with powerful 3D hardware:
- 64-bit CPU, a capable GPU, advanced anti-aliasing and texture filtering for its time.
- Four controller ports built in, encouraging local multiplayer.
But Nintendo chose to stick with ROM cartridges:
- Pros: instant loading, robust physical media, better control over piracy and distribution.
- Cons: high manufacturing cost per unit, much smaller storage than CDs, logistics risk for publishers.
As a result:
- Many third-party publishers were wary of tying up capital in expensive carts.
- FMV and voiced dialogue were constrained by capacity.
- Big cinematic projects gravitated toward PlayStation instead.
N64 still produced landmark design work — Super Mario 64, Ocarina of Time, GoldenEye 007 — but commercially, it ceded the mass-market lead to Sony.
iQue Player — A Late N64 for Mainland China
With traditional consoles effectively banned in mainland China during the late ’90s and early ’00s, Nintendo partnered with local firm iQue (founded by Dr. Wei Yen) to release the iQue Player in 2003.
The device squeezed N64 silicon into a controller-sized shell that plugged directly into a TV and drew games from flash memory.
- Titles were purchased via kiosk downloads in Chinese shopping malls, avoiding boxed media and helping Nintendo satisfy local regulations.
- The library leaned on N64 classics such as Super Mario 64, Ocarina of Time, and Star Fox 64, all localized into simplified Chinese for the first time.
- Save data lived inside the controller and could be backed up to memory cards, a nod to the system’s kiosk-driven software flow.
iQue Player arrived years after the N64’s global run, but it highlighted how hardware makers contorted their designs to reach huge but restricted markets — a reminder that “generation” boundaries look very different outside North America and Japan.
Why Final Fantasy VII Left Nintendo
Square had a long history with Nintendo. But when it came to Final Fantasy VII, they jumped.
- Nintendo 64 cartridges topped out around 64 MB for commercial releases.
- A single FFVII disc on PS1 held around 700 MB, and the game shipped on three discs.
- Most of that space went to CG cinematics and audio — exactly the things Square wanted to lean on for a more cinematic FF.
Square’s leadership has since been explicit: the choice of PlayStation was driven by CD-ROM capacity and flexibility, not just raw polygon power.
On N64, FFVII would have required heavy cuts to the cinematic content; on PS1, it could be the sprawling CG-driven RPG they envisioned.
This one decision symbolized a broader migration:
RPGs and many narrative-heavy games followed the storage.
Complexity, Confidence, and Misfires: Saturn and CD-i
Sega Saturn — 2D Power, 3D Confusion
The Saturn was Sega’s 32-bit machine:
- Architected around dual CPUs and multiple coprocessors.
- Exceptionally strong at 2D sprite handling and certain 3D workloads.
But:
- The multi-CPU design was hard to optimize for; dev tools lagged.
- Sega’s prior missteps with add-ons (Mega-CD, 32X) had already shaken retailer confidence.
- The surprise early launch in North America angered some retail partners.
Saturn found a loyal niche (especially in Japan), but could not match PlayStation’s momentum or library breadth.
Victor V-Saturn — Licensed Twin with Cosmetic Flair
To widen retail reach inside Japan, Sega licensed the Saturn hardware to major electronics partners. Victor (JVC) shipped the V-Saturn line in 1995 under model numbers RG-JX1 and later RG-JX2.
- Internally, these machines mirrored Sega’s revisions; the differences were aesthetic and branding focused.
- A darker chassis, Victor logos, and bespoke boot animations gave the console a hi-fi vibe, and some bundles included Victor-branded controllers.
- Because the BIOS tweaks were cosmetic, V-Saturn supported the full Saturn software library and peripherals with no compatibility caveats.
Collectors chase the V-Saturn today not for new capabilities, but because it captures the brief moment when Sega tried letting trusted manufacturing partners sell “clone” hardware to keep momentum in its home market.
Philips CD-i — Licensed Characters, No Real Direction
The CD-i wasn’t a traditional console; Philips marketed it as a “multimedia player”.
- Its hardware targeted video and simple interactivity for educational titles.
- As part of its deal with Nintendo, Philips published a handful of officially licensed Zelda and Mario games.
Those games were notorious — clunky controls, awkward animation, minimal oversight from Nintendo.
CD-i showed that IP licensing without platform focus doesn’t create a successful console.
What Comes Next
By the end of the 1990s, the winning formula was clearer:
- CDs (and later DVDs) reduced manufacturing cost and enabled “big” games.
- A developer-friendly platform holder could reshape third-party gravity.
The next shift wasn’t just more storage. It was consoles becoming living-room appliances — DVD players, hard drives, and online services — and the first real “service layer” taking hold.